Civil Liberties: Judicial Immunity Prisoners\u27 Rights, Title VII and School Desegregation by Erlinder, C. Peter & Evenson, Debra
Chicago-Kent Law Review 
Volume 57 Issue 1 Article 4 
January 1981 
Civil Liberties: Judicial Immunity Prisoners' Rights, Title VII and 
School Desegregation 
C. Peter Erlinder 
Debra Evenson 
Follow this and additional works at: https://scholarship.kentlaw.iit.edu/cklawreview 
 Part of the Law Commons 
Recommended Citation 
C. P. Erlinder & Debra Evenson, Civil Liberties: Judicial Immunity Prisoners' Rights, Title VII and School 
Desegregation , 57 Chi.-Kent L. Rev. 57 (1981). 
Available at: https://scholarship.kentlaw.iit.edu/cklawreview/vol57/iss1/4 
This Article is brought to you for free and open access by Scholarly Commons @ IIT Chicago-Kent College of Law. 
It has been accepted for inclusion in Chicago-Kent Law Review by an authorized editor of Scholarly Commons @ IIT 
Chicago-Kent College of Law. For more information, please contact jwenger@kentlaw.iit.edu, 
ebarney@kentlaw.iit.edu. 
CIVIL LIBERTIES: JUDICIAL IMMUNITY, PRISONERS'




The character of an appellate court is determined more by its in-
terpretation and application of opinions of the United States Supreme
Court 'than by its enunciation of new doctrine. Because many of the
civil liberties cases decided by the United States Court of Appeals for
the Seventh Circuit during 1979-80 were decisions of panels composed
of members of the circuit as well as judges from other jurisdictions sit-
ting by designation, the Seventh Circuit cannot be said to speak with a
consistent voice even in its application of Supreme Court precedent.
Such application during the 1979-80 term ranged from strictly literal to
expansive.
In the 1979-80 term the Seventh Circuit considered a broad range
of civil rights issues including: housing discrimination,' employment
discrimination, 2 freedom of religion, 3 residential picketing,4 the scope
of liability under section 1983,5 judicial immunity,6 school desegrega-
tion,7 prisoners' rights, 8 and the bases for constitutional due process
* Clinical Staff Attorney and Lecturer in Law, Illinois Institute of Technology Chicago
Kent College of Law. J.D., Chicago Kent College of Law; member of the Illinois Bar.
** Assistant Professor of Law, DePaul University College of Law. J.D., Rutgers University
Law School; member of the Illinois and New York Bars.
I. Eg., Metropolitan Housing Development Corp. v. Village of Arlington Heights, 616 F.2d
1006 (7th Cir. 1980); Blockman v. Sandalwood Apartments, Duvan, Inc., 613 F.2d 169 (7th Cir.
1980).
2. Eg., Holder v. Old Ben Coal Co., 618 F.2d 1198 (7th Cir. 1980); Grayson v. Wickes
Corp., 607 F.2d 1194 (7th Cir. 1979); Carroll v. Talman Federal Savings & Loan Assoc., 604 F.2d
1028 (7th Cir. 1979); Kamberos v. GTE Automatic Electric, Inc., 603 F.2d 598 (7th Cir. 1979).
3. E.g., Palmer v. Board of Educ., 603 F.2d 1271 (7th Cir. 1979); International Soc'y for
Krishna Consciousness v. Brown, 600 F.2d 667 (7th Cir. 1979).
4. E.g., Brown v. Scott, 602 F.2d 791 (7th Cir. 1979).
5. E.g., Jordan v. Wolke, 615 F.2d 749 (7th Cir. 1980); Mescall v. Burrus, 603 F.2d 1266 (7th
Cir. 1979).
6. Lopez v. Vanderwater, 620 F.2d 1229 (7th Cir. 1980); Ashbrook v. Hoffman, 617 F.2d 474
(7th Cir. 1980); Harris v. Harvey, 605 F.2d 330 (7th Cir. 1979).
7. United States v. Board of School Comm'rs, No. 79-1875 (7th Cir. Apr. 29, 1980); Arm-
strong v. Board of School Directors, 616 F.2d 305 (7th Cir. 1980); Johnson v. Board of Educ., 604
F.2d 504 (7th Cir. 1979).
8. E.g., Trapnell v. Riggsby, 622 F.2d 290 (7th Cir. 1980); Averhart v. Tutsie, 618 F.2d 479
(7th Cir. 1980); Stringer v. Rowe, 616 F.2d 993 (7th Cir. 1980); Jordan v. Wolke, 615 F.2d 749 (7th
Cir. 1980).
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rights.9 Because restrictions on time and length make reasonable dis-
cussion of all the issues addressed impossible, only cases in the follow-
ing areas will be discussed: judicial immunity under 42 U.S.C. § 1983,
prisoners' rights, employment discrimination under Title VII of the
Civil Rights Act and school desegregation.
JUDICIAL IMMUNITY
The judicial immunity doctrine as it related to liability under 42
U.S.C. § 1983 was most recently defined by the United States Supreme
Court in Stump v. Sparkman. ° In Sparkman, the Court reversed the
Seventh Circuit's finding that judicial immunity did not protect an In-
diana judge who had ordered the sterilization of a minor upon petition
of her mother in an ex parte proceeding. I I
Traditionally, judicial immunity applied to all judicial acts except
those done in the clear absence of jurisdiction.' 2 The Seventh Circuit
in Sparkman assumed that "jurisdiction" meant only subject matter ju-
risdiction and the Supreme Court accepted this standard without anal-
ysis or discussion. '3 The Supreme Court did not agree, however, that
the judge in Sparkman had acted in the clear absence of subject matter
jurisdiction. Because the judge was not specifically precluded from act-
ing as he did under Indiana law, the Supreme Court held that he had
performed a judicial act which was within the subject matter jurisdic-
tion of the court and was, therefore, immune. "4 It is within this context
that the Seventh Circuit again addressed the issue of a judge's liability
for damages under section 1983, in Lopez v. Vanderwater, '5 .Ashbrook v.
Hoffman, 16 and Harris v. Harvey. 17
Lopez v. Vanderwater
In Lopez v. Vanderwater, the plaintiff alleged a denial of civil
9. Eg., Averhart v. Tutsie, 618 F.2d 479 (7th Cir. 1980); Coyne-Delaney Co. v. Capital Dev.
Bd., 616 F.2d 341 (7th Cir. 1980); Jordan v. Wolke, 615 F.2d 749 (7th Cir. 1980); McElearney v.
University of Ill., 612 F.2d 285 (7th Cir. 1979); Agustin v. Quern, 611 F.2d 206 (7th Cir. 1979);
Thompson v. Schmidt, 601 F.2d 305 (7th Cir. 1979); Kyees v. County Dept. of Pub. Welfare, 600
F.2d 693 (7th Cir. 1979).
10. 435 U.S. 349 (1978). For a general discussion of liability under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 see S.
NAHMOD, CIVIL RIGHTS & CIVIL LIBERTIES LITIGATION (1979).
11. 435 U.S. 349 (1978).
12. Laycock, Civil Rights and Civil Liberties, 54 CHI.-KENT L. REV. 390 (1977) [hereinafter
cited as Laycock].
13. 435 U.S. at 357.
14. Id. at 364.
15. 620 F.2d 1229 (7th Cir. 1980).
16. 617 F.2d 474 (7th Cir. 1980).
17. 605 F.2d 330 (7th Cir. 1980).
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rights arising from the defendant judge's actions in sentencing the
plaintiff to prison without the benefit of a hearing. Plaintiffs complaint
alleged that the defendant judge caused a criminal complaint to be
filed, prepared an arrest warrant on his own motion, entered a guilty
plea and jury waiver without plaintiff's knowledge, and arraigned, con-
victed and sentenced plaintiff to Vandalia State Prison without a hear-
ing or waiver of his right to a trial. These events allegedly occurred at a
police station in the middle of the night while plaintiff was locked in a
cell, during hours when the court was not in session and when only the
judge and a few police officers were present.' 8
The district court granted the defendant's motion for summary
judgment under the doctrine of judicial immunity after Vanderwater's
Chief Judge expressed the opinion that assignment of a case to
Vanderwater's court was not a prerequisite for subject matter jurisdic-
tion.' 9 On appeal, the Seventh Circuit reversed. Judge Tone, writing
for the panel, applied a two-step analysis drawn from Stump v. Spark-
man 20 and Bradley v. Fisher.21 In order for immunity to attach: first,
18. 620 F.2d at 1231. The plaintiffs complaint alleged that defendant Vanderwater, an asso-
ciate judge of the Illinois Sixteenth Judicial Circuit, had been the part-owner of an apartment
building in Aurora. Although the record does not reflect whether he retained ownership after he
became a judge, he continued to collect rent each week on behalf of the owners. Flor Lopez,
formerly a tenant in the building, had fallen behind in his rent and had moved out when re-
quested to do so by Vanderwater. Id.
Approximately one month later, Vanderwater got a telephone report from another tenant that
Flor Lopez was back in the building. Vanderwater asked the tenant to call the police and went to
the building armed with a handgun. Vanderwater found Lopez asleep in his former apartment,
awakened him, detained him at gunpoint and held him for the police. Lopez was searched, ar-
rested for criminal trespass at the urging of Vanderwater, and taken to the Aurora police station.
According to the deposition of Lopez, he had returned to the building to pay Vanderwater the
back rent. Id. at n. 1.
When Vanderwater arrived at the police station, the facilities of the Aurora Branch Court
and prosecutor's office, which are housed in the same building, were locked. Vanderwater then
called one of the partners who owned the building and asked him to come down to sign a com-
plaint against Lopez. In deposition Vanderwater stated that he originally intended to charge Lo-
pez with criminal trespass but reconsidered and charged him with theft after Lopez was found to
be in possession of a key to the apartment. When Vanderwater's former partner arrived at the
station, he found Vanderwater and one of the arresting officers alone in the prosecutor's office.
Vanderwater prepared a complaint which was signed by the others and he also prepared an arrest
warrant for Lopez. At about that time he also stated that he would put Lopez in Vandalia State
Prison for 240 days. Vanderwater also filled out a form indicating a plea of guilty and a waiver of
a jury trial. Id at 1232.
Although Lopez was in his cell during this period and claims never to have signed the plea
and waiver form, he was arraigned, convicted and sentenced by Vanderwater in the booking area
of the station. After spending some six days in jail, Lopez was released from custody at the re-
quest of his attorney and a month later the judgment of conviction was vacated. Vanderwater was
eventually removed from the bench by the Illinois Courts Commission. Id at 1233. Lopez
brought suit under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, alleging that Vanderwater had abused his authority as a
judge.
19. Id at 1233 n.3.
20. 435 U.S. 349 (1978).
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the act, even if "malicious," "corrupt" or "in excess, . . . of jurisdic-
tion," must not have been taken in the "absence of jurisdiction"; 22 sec-
ond, the action must have been a "judicial act."
'23
In a footnote, the court attempted to clarify the distinction be-
tween "in excess" and "clear absence" of all jurisdiction. 24 The distinc-
tion, according to the court, is that a probate judge could be held liable
for trying a criminal matter but a criminal judge would not be held
liable for convicting a defendant of a non-existent crime.25 The court
also indicated that under Sparkman, an inquiry is required into
whether the act at issue is one "normally performed by a judge" and
whether the parties had the expectation of dealing with the judge in his
judicial capacity.
26
Even though Vanderwater had not been assigned to the Aurora
Court and the acts in question had occurred outside the courtroom
proper, the court held that there was no "clear absence of jurisdic-
tion."' 27 The Seventh Circuit reached that conclusion because it is not
clear under Illinois law that judicial assignments are jurisdictional and
because many valid judicial acts occur outside a courtroom. 28 On the
"judicial acts" issue the court upheld the conclusion of the district
court, that Vanderwater's acts in arraigning, convicting and sentencing
Lopez were those "normally performed by a judge," thus meeting the
first portion of the Sparkman "judicial acts" test. 29 However, the court
declined to apply the second portion of the test,30 "whether the parties
dealt with the judge in his judicial capacity." The court recognized that
Lopez was "unable to deal with Vanderwater in his judicial role" be-
cause he was unaware of the proceeding and because in this case the
judge was also the complainant. 3' Rather than concluding from these
facts that the judge's acts were non-judicial, the court concluded that
these facts made the Sparkman standard "inapplicable" in this case.
32
As a result, Vanderwater was found to be absolutely immune from lia-
21. 80 U.S. (13 Wall.) 335 (1872).
22. 620 F.2d at 1233.
23. Id
24. Id at 1233 n.4.
25. Id at 1234 n.8.
26. Stump v. Sparkman, 435 U.S. 349, 362 (1978).
27. 620 F.2d at 1234.
28. Id
29. Id
30. Id at 1235.
31. Id
32. Id The court relied upon the fact that Linda Sparkman was unaware of the hearing on
her mother's petition for sterilization as support for the proposition that the "expectations of the
parties" requirement of Sparkman was not relevant to Lopez. Id at 1235 n. 11.
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bility for his acts in arraigning, convicting and sentencing Lopez in an
exparte proceeding in which the judge was also the moving party.
33
The court, however, found Vanderwater liable for those acts which
were of a prosecutorial nature. Because Vanderwater made the deci-
sion to prosecute, prepared the charge and the plea, prepared the
waiver of trial and presented himself with the charge and plea form,
the court found he had committed acts which were not normally judi-
cial in nature and which were, therefore, unprotected by judicial immu-
nity. 34 Furthermore, the court observed that these acts also were
undertaken in the "absence of all jurisdiction" since prosecutorial acts
are not within the Illinois Circuit Judge's grant of jurisdiction in the
Illinois Constitution.
35
Through this device, and the absence of prosecutorial immunity,
the court found that Vanderwater was not immune for the violations of
the plaintiff's rights including due process, right to counsel, right to a
jury trial and confrontation of witnesses.
36
The court rejected the defendant's argument that he could not be
found to have acted outside of his power as a judge and also be found
to have acted "under color of state law" as required by section 1983.
Recognizing this apparent inconsistency, which was referred to by the
dissent in Sparkman, the court concluded that in this case it was only
because Vanderwater was a judge that his prosecutorial acts were pos-
sible and that it was this improper "use of. . .office" which exposed
him to liability.
37
While the result of the Lopez case is not likely to come under
much criticism, the difficulty the court had in reaching its conclusion
demonstrates some of the difficulties implicit in the Sparkman "subject
matter jurisdiction" standard and the importance of developing a care-
ful analysis of the "judicial acts" portion of the Sparkman test.
Justice Stewart, writing for the dissent in Sparkman, pointed out
that the limitation of the "absence of all jurisdiction" requirement to
subject matter jurisdiction held the danger that judges of general juris-
diction would not be constrained from carrying out egregious acts such
as sterilization or imprisonment. 38 According to Justice Stewart this
raises the spectre of judges who are free like "loose cannon to inflict
33. Id at 1235.
34. Id
35. Id at 1235 n.13.
36. Id at 1235-36.
37. Id at 1237.
38. 435 U.S. at 367 n.5.
CHICAGO KENT LAW REVIEW
indiscriminate damage." 39 In an earlier analysis of Sparkman, Profes-
sor Douglas Laycock pointed out that this limitation to "subject matter
jurisdiction only" is not mandated by earlier cases and that Bradley v.
Fisher,40 upon which the Seventh Circuit relied in Sparkman, can be
read to support the requirement of personal jurisdiction as well.4 ' It is
this subtle and seemingly almost inadvertent alteration of the tradi-
tional immunity standard which made Sparkman a difficult case. It
has, in effect, shifted the inquiry to the issue of the general powers of
the court rather than its power over the person before the court.
4 2
Although there are obvious inequities which flow from the adop-
tion of the subject matter jurisdiction standard, those issues are beyond
the scope of this discussion. 43 The central issue raised by Lopez is
whether the Seventh Circuit was correct in concluding that Sparkman
necessarily required a finding that Judge Vanderwater had subject mat-
ter jurisdiction and that he performed a judicial act when he caused
Lopez to be incarcerated through an exparte criminal proceeding.
Implicit in the Supreme Court's discussion in Sparkman was the
assumption that state law controls the extent of a judge's discretion in
the area of parental rights and in ordering tubal ligations.44 The issue
39. Id. at 367.
40. 80 U.S. (13 Wall.) 335 (1872).
41. Laycock, supra note 12, at 393.
42. Once this shift had been accomplished, the Supreme Court could quite logically con-
clude, as it did in Sparkman, that courts of general jurisdiction are free to operate without liability
except as specifically restricted by the statutes which empower them to hear certain types of cases.
It is also this alteration in the traditional standard which forced the Seventh Circuit in Lopez to
rely upon liability for prosecutorial acts in a case which clearly called for some sort of liability for
the judge in question. That the Seventh Circuit concluded that a judge of general jurisdiction
could arraign, convict and sentence a defendant in an exparte criminal proceeding without incur-
ring liability for those acts is ample evidence that Justice Stewart's concern regarding "loose can-
nons" was well founded. See text accompanying note 39 supra.
43. For a discussion of these issues see Laycock, supra note 12.
44. See text accompanying note 41 supra. 435 U.S. at 358-60. After accepting the Seventh
Circuit's assertion that "subject matter jurisdiction" was the standard to be applied, the Supreme
Court in Sparkman disagreed that the judge acted in "clear absence of all jurisdiction." 1d at
357-58. This conclusion was based upon the Court's analysis of the Indiana Code, which included
a broad jurisdictional grant. Id at 358. The Court noted that while there was no express author-
ity to order a tubal ligation in the Indiana statutes it was more important that there was no Indi-
ana statute and no case law prohibiting the judge from hearing a petition of the type presented by
the mother. Id There was, in fact, some statutory authority for Indiana courts to order the sterili-
zation of institutionalized persons and authority for parents to consent and contract for surgery on
behalf of their children. IND. CODE § 16-8-4-2 (1973). Most importantly, Indiana had never spe-
cifically circumscribed the power of the court to hear such a petition. 435 U.S. at 358. Thus, the
Court concluded that because Judge Stump presided over a court of general jurisdiction "the lack
of a specific statute authorizing his approval of the petition" did not subject him to liability. Id at
359-60. The natural implication is that, had such a limitation existed, Judge Stump might well
have been liable because the acts performed would have been outside the jurisdiction granted by
the state.
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before the Court in Sparkman involved a proceeding which was not
specifically controlled by state or federal law. However, because the
Court looked to Indiana law to determine the scope of Judge Stump's
immunity in a case controlled by Indiana law, it is not unreasonable to
conclude that a case which dealt with actions prohibited by state or
federal decisions, statutes or the Constitution should be analyzed in the
same manner.
A close reading of Sparkman indicates that the judge in Lopez
may have lacked the jurisdiction necessary to claim immunity in light
of the clear mandates of the fifth, sixth and fourteenth amendments,
not to mention possible limitations imposed by the Illinois Constitution
and case law.45 If it is necessary to look to the law empowering the
court in question to determine whether the judge had the power to act
as he did, the Seventh Circuit may have unnecessarily concluded that
because Judge Vanderwater sat in a court of general jurisdiction he was
unconstrained by restrictions placed upon criminal prosecutions by the
Constitution or by Illinois law.
In Lopez, the Seventh Circuit also addressed the effect which the
denial of due process would have on the jurisdictional issue. The court
relied on Sparkman for the proposition that "grave procedural errors
were not sufficient to deprive a judge of all jurisdiction. ' 46 But the
Seventh Circuit failed to note that neither Sparkman nor Bradley dealt
with rights which were specifically embodied in the Constitution.4 7 It is
not a necessary conclusion from Sparkman that exparte criminal pro-
ceedings which result in the loss of liberty through the denial of the
right to a trial by jury and which thereby directl violate the Constitu-
tion are within the "subject matter jurisdiction" of the court, even a
court of general jurisdiction.
The "judicial acts" inquiry which is mandated by Sparkman was
45. It is well established that the sixth amendment right to a public trial has been made
applicable to the states. See, e.g., Duncan v. Louisiana, 391 U.S. 145 (1968). The fundamental
nature of a defendant's right to be present and to a public trial was recognized much earlier in
Illinois. People v. Kirilenko, 1 111. 2d 90, 115 N.E.2d 297 (1953). Although this right may be
waived by the defendant under certain circumstances, see, e.g., Illinois v. Allen, 397 U.S. 337
(1970) and Taylor v. United States, 414 U.S. 17 (1973), Illinois courts have consistently held that it
is constitutionally impermissible to try a defendant ex parte without a voluntary waiver of that
right by the defendant. See, e.g., People v. Davis, 39 Ill. 2d 325, 235 N.E.2d 634 (1968); People v.
Mallett, 30 I11. 2d 136, 195 N.E.2d 687 (1964); People v. Etheridge, 35 Ill. App. 3d 981, 343 N.E.2d
55 (3d Dist. 1976).
46. 435 U.S. at 359.
47. Neither the denial of a license to practice law (Bradley) nor a child's right to be free from
parentally imposed sterilization (Sparkman) has been treated with the attention given to criminal
proceedings in which the rights of the defendant are well known and which require constitution-
ally guaranteed procedures such as a trial.
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quickly disposed of by the Seventh Circuit in Lopez. The two-step in-
quiry which is required prior to finding a judge immune requires first,
that the challenged acts were those "normally performed by a judge"
and second, that the parties "dealt with the judge in his judicial capac-
ity."48
There can be little disagreement that the Lopez case falls within
the first portion of the test; arraigning, convicting and sentencing a de-
fendant are clearly acts which judges normally perform.
However, the second portion of the test, regarding the expectations
of the parties, presented a problem which the court resolved by finding
that this portion of the test simply did not apply to this case. 49 This
treatment is unfortunate in that the Seventh Circuit bypassed an oppor-
tunity to develop what may prove to be an important limitation upon
the immunity granted the judiciary in Sparkman. The Seventh Circuit
justified ignoring the second requirement by pointing out that the judi-
cial act requirement was met in Sparkman although the subject of the
petition was unaware that judicial proceedings had been instituted on
her behalf 50 This, the court concluded, indicated that the Supreme
Court must not have found the second criterion relevant in Spark-
man.-5 The result of this analysis by the Seventh Circuit is to make the
second criterion meaningless and to suggest that the Supreme Court
included a useless test in Sparkman.
A more logically consistent reading of Sparkman suggests that the
second criterion was met in that case. It was not met by Linda Spark-
man, who, under Indiana law, was apparently not a necessary party,
but by her mother who was a party and who approached the judge in
his judicial capacity. It was the expectation of the mother that was at
issue in Sparkman and it was her expectation that met the second por-
tion of the judicial act requirement.
This "expectation of the parties" portion of the judicial acts test
takes on increased importance in light of the Supreme Court's rejection
of personal jurisdiction as a threshhold requirement for a claim of judi-
cial immunity. In requiring some consideration of the expectations of
the parties before the Court, the Sparkman test can be read to ame-
lioriate some of the potential for abuse which is inherent in the "pure"
subject matter jurisdiction standard.5 2 The requirement that, in addi-
48. 435 U.S. at 359.
49. 620 F.2d at 1235.
50. Id at 1235 n.1l.
51. Id
52. Laycock, supra note 12, at 401.
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tion to the acts in question being the sort performed by judges, the
parties had the expectation of "dealing with the judge in a judicial ca-
pacity" implies inquiry first, into whether the person injured was prop-
erly a party to the proceeding in question and, second, whether they
had a legally sufficient awareness of the judicial proceeding and the
judge's role.
In Sparkman, since there was apparently no requirement in Indi-
ana law that a minor child be a party to the petition submitted to the
court by the mother, liability did not attach. However, in criminal
prosecutions, a defendant is a necessary party whose presence at trial is
constitutionally mandated, unless waived.5 3 Therefore, a criminal de-
fendant's presence or proof of his voluntary absence after a trial com-
mences may well be necessary before a judicial act can occur even
under Sparkman. This standard might well have been used to justify
the imposition of liability for conducting an exparte criminal proceed-
ing.
The importance of leaving open this inquiry into whether a "judi-
cial act" actually occurred is illustrated by the possibility raised by Lo-
pez that, on slightly different facts, the judge could have escaped
liability completely. Because the opinion assumed almost unlimited ju-
dicial immunity, the case actually turned upon the fact that the judge
did not interpose a prosecutor between the arrest and the arraign-
ment.5 4 Had Judge Vanderwater induced a state's attorney to carry out
the prosecutorial functions in the Lopez case, both the judge and the
prosecutor might well have been able to rely upon immunity and Mr.
Lopez would have been precluded from seeking relief, other than ap-
peal, for his clearly unlawful incarceration.
Although Lopez may be seen as an indication that Sparkman did
not create a grant of absolute immunity for all actions undertaken by a
judge, the method employed by the Seventh Circuit to reach that con-
clusion did little to clarify the proper application of the Sparkman test.
Because the court accepted without thorough discussion the subject
matter jurisdiction standard which it had created, and because it chose
to ignore the expectations requirements of Sparkman, the court was
compelled to rely upon prosecutorial acts as a means of finding liabil-
ity. In so doing the Seventh Circuit may have unnecessarily reinforced
the aspect of Sparkman which effectively puts the acts of judges outside
the reach of section 1983 liability.
53. See note 45 supra.
54. 620 F.2d at 12.
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Ashbrook v. Hoffman
In Ashbrook v. Hoffman, 55 a panel of the Seventh Circuit ad-
dressed another aspect of the judicial immunity question: what factors
determine whether an officer of the state who is not a judge may claim
judicial immunity under Sparkman.
The plaintiff, Charles Ashbrook, was granted an undivided one-
half interest in a restaurant as part of a court ordered divorce decree.
Florence Ashbrook sued Charles for partition and the court, contrary
to Indiana law, appointed Charles' and Florence's attorneys as parti-
tion commissioners for the sale. 56 Plaintiff claimed that Harlan Hoff-
man, Florence's attorney, and James Hooper, Charles' attorney, failed
to properly advertise the sale. In addition, plaintiff alleged that Hoff-
man aided Florence in bidding on the property in violation of state
law, causing plaintiff a loss of $70,000. After the sale, Hooper refused
to accede to Charles' wishes that the sale be attacked. Thereafter, the
attorneys represented to the court that they had distributed Charles'
share of the proceeds. Charles claimed that, rather than distributing
the proceeds, the attorneys had deposited his share with the Clerk of
the Court and, after Hooper withdrew as Charles' counsel, a lien for
fees was granted to Hooper without notice or a hearing being given to
Charles.57 The defendant commissioners contended that they were ab-
solutely immune from plaintiffs section 1983 claims under Stump v.
Sparkman because they were performing duties intimately related to
the judicial process or were executing directives of the supervising
court. 58 The Seventh Circuit agreed, and affirmed the conclusion of the
district court that Indiana partition commissioners are entitled to "ab-
solute quasi-judicial immunity" from liability for damages under sec-
tion 1983.
59
The court in Ashbrook relied upon Imbler v. Pachtman,60 a
prosecutorial immunity case, for the principle that officers who perform
acts which are an "integral part of the judicial process" are also abso-
lutely immune for their quasi-judicial conduct. 6' According to the
55. 617 F.2d 474 (7th Cir. 1980).
56. Id at 475.
57. Id
58. ld at 476.
59. Id at 475.
60. 424 U.S. 409 (1976).
61. 617 F.2d at 476. The court listed cases from several other circuits as examples of court
related officers who had been granted immunity under the Imbler rationale. Kermit Constr. Corp.
v. Credito Y Ahorro Ponceno, 547 F.2d I (1st Cir. 1976) (receivers); Lockhart v. Hoenstine, 411
F.2d 455 (3d Cir.), cert. denied, 396 U.S. 941 (1969) (prothonotaries); Stift v. Lynch, 267 F.2d 237
(7th Cir. 1959) (justices of the peace).
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court, the policy considerations underlying the determination of immu-
nity are: (1) the necessity of freedom from harassment for officials who
must make discretionary judgments, and (2) the belief that delegated
officers should not be a "lightning rod" for attacks aimed at the court.
62
The Seventh Circuit concluded that a grant of immunity for acts com-
mitted by officers in the performance of an "integral part of the judicial
process" was the appropriate standard to meet those policy objectives. 63
The court did not address the policy considerations regarding good
faith in the performance of those acts, which was a central issue dis-
cussed by the Supreme Court in Wood v. Strickland,64 another case
involving quasi-judicial immunity.
The Seventh Circuit recognized that the central issue was, there-
fore, the nature of the relationship between the acts of the official in
question and the judicial process. 65 The court concluded that the duties
of Indiana partition commissioners entitled them to quasi-judicial im-
munity.66 In support of that conclusion, the court reviewed what it
considered to be the relevant aspects of the tasks of the commission-
ers. 67 These factors, according to the court, suggest the kind of integral
relationship that warranted not only quasi-judicial immunity, but the
absolute immunity of Sparkman rather than the qualified "good faith"
immunity of Wood v. Strickland.
68
Judge Wood, writing for the panel, concluded that the acts alleged
in the complaint were official duties in "aid of the court" 69 requiring
immunity. Possible improprieties in the advertising of the property, in
disposal of proceeds short of misappropriation, in the bidding process
and in an alleged cover-up of wrongdoing are all activities for which
the commissioners are absolutely immune.70 The Seventh Circuit held
that the court supervised attorney-commissioners were properly dis-
missed from the suit. 7'
62. 617 F.2d at 476.
63. Id
64. 420 U.S. 308 (1975).
65. 617 F.2d at 476, citing Daniels v. Kieser, 586 F.2d 64, 69 (7th Cir. 1978), cert. denied, 441
U.S. 931 (1979).
66. 617 F.2d at 476.
67. Partition proceedings begin with a complaint and result in a decree of partition; commis-
sioners are appointed and reviewed by a court; commissioners make a judgment whether the prop-
erty at issue may be divided without damage to the owners; commissioners prepare a report of
partition which, if confirmed by the court, is entered in the record book. Id
68. Id at 477. The court suggested that the presence of an appeal process was also a justifica-
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There is general agreement that some sort of quasi-judicial immu-
nity is available for public officials who are not actually members of the
judiciary. 72 The scope of that immunity, however, is not settled. The
two major and conflicting trends are grounded, first, in differences re-
garding the method of determining whether a particular official is enti-
tled to quasi-judicial immunity73 and, second, if such immunity
applies, whether it is absolute or qualified.
74
In determining whether an official may claim quasi-judicial immu-
nity, both trends begin with an analysis of the functions of the officer in
light of the rationale underlying judicial immunity: that those who
must make discretionary judgments should not be punished for carry-
ing out their official function.75 One trend, exemplified by Ashbrook,
then looks to the relationship between the challenged act and the judi-
cial process to determine whether the act was an "integral part of that
process."'76 The other trend, exemplified by the Supreme Court's anal-
ysis in Wood v. Strickland, looks to whether the challenged acts fell
within the scope of the discretionary judgments which the official was
called upon to make.
77
The first method of analysis is obviously less than precise and
gives little guidance as to what constitutes an "integral part" of the ju-
dicial process. This leads, of necessity, to a standardless case-by-case
decision-making process that gives little direction to the courts and
which may actually impede officials from acting for fear that their
function is not "integral." As pointed out in Ashbrook, this also leads
to immunity for officials with extremely diverse duties. 78 The common
thread which binds them is that they are "intimately associated with
the judicial process."' 79 However, since the nature of this "association"
remains undefined, this standard does not really address the objectives
72. Johnson v. Wells, 566 F.2d 1016 (5th Cir. 1978); Smith v. Rosenbaum, 460 F.2d 1019 (3d
Cir. 1972); Lucarel v. McNair, 453 F.2d 836 (6th Cir. 1972); but see McCray v. Maryland, 456
F.2d 1 (4th Cir. 1972); Burkes v. Callion, 433 F.2d 318 (9th Cir. 1970), cert. denied, 403 U.S. 908
(1971); Lynch v. Johnson, 420 F.2d 818 (6th Cir. 1970); Stift v. Lynch, 267 F.2d 237 (7th Cir.
1959).
73. See, e.g., Wood v. Strickland, 420 U.S. 308 (1975); Burkes v. Callion, 433 F.2d 318 (9th
Cir. 1970), cert. denied, 403 U.S. 908 (1971).
74. See, e.g., McCray v. Maryland, 456 F.2d I (4th Cir. 1972).
75. See, e.g., Stump v. Sparkman, 435 U.S. 349 (1978); Imbler v. Pachtman, 424 U.S. 409
(1976); Wood v. Strickland, 420 U.S. 308 (1975); Scheuer v. Rhodes, 416 U.S. 232 (1974); Pierson
v. Ray, 386 U.S. 547 (1967); Tenney v. Brandhove, 341 U.S. 367 (1951).
76. 617 F.2d at 476, citing Imbler v. Pachtman, 424 U.S. 409 (1976) (absolute immunity for
prosecutors).
77. See, e.g., 420 U.S. 308 (1975).
78. 617 F.2d at 476.
79. Id
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of the doctrine. As the Fourth Circuit pointed out, functions per-
formed by judges which require judicial immunity are not performed
by many officials who, "though intimately related to the judicial proc-
ess," do not make or carry out judicial decisions.
80
The better methodology can be found in Wood v. Strickland.81 In
Wood, the Supreme Court analyzed the status of school board officials,
not on the basis of their relationship to the judicial process but rather
on the basis of the similarities between their function and that of a
court.8 2 Because they were required to make determinations which
were both legislative and adjudicatory, immunity was found to at-
tach.83 It is submitted that a test which looks to the existence of discre-
tionary power, rather than an abstract relationship to the judicial
system, most closely meets the policy objectives associated with judicial
immunity.
This is not to say, of course, that officials who carry out specific
orders of the court should not be entitled to the immunity that the court
may claim in issuing that order.8 4 Under such circumstances the rela-
tionship is clear and there should be little question that the instrument
of the court is entitled to absolute immunity. The question is whether
those officials whose functions are merely "related to" the judicial proc-
ess but who are not acting "pursuant to" the direction or order of the
court should also be able to avail themselves of the immunity granted
to the judiciary.
There is little support in the Supreme Court's treatment of judicial
immunity for the extension of absolute immunity to officers outside the
judiciary.85 In fact, the Sparkman case makes clear that there are limi-
tations even upon the judiciary's ability to avail itself of absolute im-
munity.8 6 Rather, in Wood, which did recognize quasi-judicial
immunity, the Court found that the appropriate level of immunity to be
applied was not absolute, but qualified. 7 Even though school board
officials were required to act in an adjudicatory capacity, the defendant
was not immune if "he knew or reasonably should have known" that
the action he took violated the rights of students.88 Presumably then,
80. See, e.g., McCray v. Maryland, 456 F.2d 1 (4th Cir. 1972).
81. 420 U.S. 308 (1975).
82. Id at 318-20.
83. Id at 319.
84. See S. NAHMOD, CIVIL RIGHTS & CIVIL LIBERTIES LITIGATION ch. 7 (1979). See also,
O'Connor v. Donaldson, 422 U.S. 563 (1975).
85. See Stump v. Sparkman, 435 U.S. 349 (1978); Wood v. Strickland, 420 U.S. 308 (1975).
86. See text accompanying notes 22-25 supra.
87. 420 U.S. at 318.
88. Id at 322.
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even if quasi-judicial immunity were found to attach to officials related
to the court, the proper scope of that immunity would be bound by the
limitations of objective and subjective good faith from Wood.89 Since
many court personnel do not engage in the level of discretionary deci-
sion-making evidenced in Wood, it makes sense, as was pointed out in
McCray v. Maryland,9" to hold that clerks and other types of court per-
sonnel are protected by only qualified immunity when not acting pur-
suant to court order.
9'
These considerations militate against the extension of absolute im-
munity adopted by the Seventh Circuit in Ashbrook. The status of par-
tition commissioners is admittedly a difficult case, which does not fit
neatly into previously defined categories. Apparently, a commissioner
has a certain amount of discretion in determining whether a parcel can
be divided and how it should be sold.92 While this is clearly an adjudi-
catory function, it is certainly not substantially more so than the func-
tion of a school board, which required only qualified immunity in
Wood.93 On the other hand, it appears that any action which is under-
taken by the commissioner must receive the confirmation of the court.
In this respect, the commissioner is closer to a court official who acts
pursuant to court order and who, therefore, becomes cloaked in the
immunity of the court.
Whether one agrees that commissioners should be absolutely im-
mune or not, the lack of clarity on the part of the Seventh Circuit in
reaching its conclusion is likely to have consequences for section 1983
litigation which may have been unintended. In light of Sparkman, the
concept of a broad grant of absolute judicial immunity is well estab-
lished. There exists not only the potential, therefore, for judges to per-
form egregious acts subject only to the remedy of appeal, but Ashbrook
indicates that such absolute immunity may be extended to many types
of court officers as well. In failing to make clear the nature of the acts
which are "integral to the judicial process" or which are "intimately
associated with the judicial process," the Seventh Circuit has provided
the basis for a wide range of public officials to claim absolute judicial
immunity.
Had the court clearly distinguished those who act pursuant to
89. This conclusion is buttressed by the finding of qualified immunity in O'Connor v. Don-
aldson, 422 U.S. 563 (1975), in which a state psychiatrist had not acted pursuant to court order.
90. 456 F.2d I (4th Cir. 1972).
91. Id
92. 617 F.2d at 476.
93. 420 U.S. 308 (1978).
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court order from other types of officers, this problem would have been
largely eliminated. A better approach might well have been to make
clear that quasi-judicial immunity, under Wood, allowed only a claim
of qualified immunity, but that in this case, the officers in question were
cloaked in the immunity of the court because the court, in approving
their partition report, adopted their acts and placed the defendants
under its immunity umbrella. As the case stands now, the status of
quasi-judicial acts and immunity, both absolute and qualified, is likely
to be the source of continuing section 1983 litigation in the Seventh
Circuit.
Harris v. Harvey
The third important case in the area of judicial immunity decided
by the Seventh Circuit recently is Harris v. Harvey.94 In Harris, the
Seventh Circuit rejected the claim that judicial immunity extended to
out of court statements made to the news media. 95 In addition, the
court made clear that the doctrine of judicial immunity does not pre-
clude the introduction into evidence of judicial acts for purposes of
proving improper motive on the part of the defendant judge.
96
The plaintiff, a black police officer, was accused of police brutality
by a defendant accused of committing felonious battery. An investiga-
tion made by the Racine Police Department found no basis for the
charges of brutality and did not discipline the plaintiff.97 The Racine
County District Attorney, however, presented a John Doe petition to
Judge Harvey for a finding of probable cause for prosecution pursuant
to Wisconsin law. 98
The plaintiff charged that Judge Harvey then used the John Doe
proceeding to carry out an earlier threat to get "that black bastard" by
threatening witnesses at the hearing who failed to incriminate the
plaintiff.99 The judge apparently told a newspaper reporter that he was
conducting a John Doe hearing regarding Harris and that plaintiff
would be charged with criminal violations. At the completion of the
hearing, the judge went on radio to read the warrants for plaintiffs
arrest and he made the statement that plaintiff refused to testify at the
94. 605 F.2d 330 (7th Cir. 1980). Although the opinion discusses other potentially important
issues as well, this article will focus exclusively on the immunity issue.
95. Id at 336-37.
96. Id at 337.
97. Id at 333.
98. Id Wisconsin law authorizes a judge to issue an arrest warrant after a probable cause
hearing in which the defendant need not be present. WIs. STAT. § 968.26 (1979).
99. 605 F.2d at 333.
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John Doe proceeding. 100
Over the next year, the judge embarked upon a course of action in
which he commented publicly on the charges against the plaintiff; pub-
licly accused plaintiff of numerous types of criminal conduct; falsely
stated that plaintiff's accuser had passed a lie detector test; demanded
of the City Attorney that plaintiff be disciplined or else Judge Harvey
would commence criminal proceedings; and instituted a second John
Doe investigation on allegations of ticket fixing. In addition, there was
a substantial amount of unrebutted evidence regarding defendant's ra-
cial motivations in acting as he did.' 0 1
Harris brought suit against Judge Harvey and the Racine County
District Attorney under section 1983. The district court dismissed the
action against the District Attorney because the complaint failed to al-
lege that he acted out of racial animus. i0 2 However, the trial court held
that a denial of equal protection was adequately alleged against de-
fendant Harvey. The judge ruled that Harvey acted under color of law
and in the absence of jurisdiction. 10 3 A claim for equitable relief was
denied because of the remoteness of further damage from future crimi-
nal proceedings against Harris. Damage claims arising from "in court"
actions by the defendant were also dismissed under the Sparkman doc-
trine.' °4 The jury was charged with deciding whether the defendant
had injured the plaintiff through non-judicial acts which were moti-
vated by racial animosity. The jury found for the plaintiff and awarded
compensatory damages of $60,000 and punitive damages of
$200,000. 105
A three-judge panel of the Seventh Circuit affirmed the district
court opinion in all respects. In an opinion by Judge Cummings, it
agreed that a racially motivated campaign, which included intentional
torts and which was carried out under color of law, was a denial of
equal protection and was within the scope of section 1983.106
On the issue of judicial immunity, the Seventh Circuit held that
the district court had properly applied Sparkman in finding that Judge
Harvey's acts outside the courtroom, which were not part of his judicial
function, were taken in the absence of all jurisdiction. The court re-
ferred specifically to the numerous comments made by the judge to the
100. Id at 334.
101. Id at 333-35.
102. Id. at 335.
103. Id at 337.
104. Id at 335.
105. Id at 336.
106. Id at 338.
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press and city officials. The Seventh Circuit held that these acts were
not judicial because (1) they were not normally functions performed by
a judge and (2) the parties did not deal with the judge in a judicial
capacity. Prosecutorial immunity was found inapplicable because the
acts alleged were not of a prosecutorial nature.1
0 7
The Seventh Circuit also rejected the defendant's argument that
the acts complained of were subject to absolute judicial immunity
under the doctrine enunciated in Barr v. Matteo, 0 8 which extended ab-
solute immunity to allegedly libelous statements made by a federal ex-
ecutive official to "explain and justify official proceedings." The court
stated that Barr was distinguishable because it dealt with federal offi-
cials and presumably did not apply to state officials. In addition, the
panel rejected the defendant's reliance upon dicta in an earlier Seventh
Circuit opinion, Skolnick v. Campbell,109 in which the court had indi-
cated that Barr v. Matteo carried the potential for an extension of judi-
cial immunity. The Seventh Circuit held that the acts of defendant
Harvey were outside the scope of those immunized by Barr." I 0
The court was also confronted with the "color of law"/"absence of
jurisdiction" inconsistency which was pointed out in Sparkman. The
Seventh Circuit held that Judge Harvey was acting under color of law
when he made use of his office to injure Harris."' Finally, the court
upheld the district court's ruling that the defendant's judicial acts were
admissible to show the defendant's state of mind or motive. 12 The
doctrine of judicial immunity was held to protect a judge from liability
for money damages but not to require that those acts be excluded from
evidence. 1 1'3
The Seventh Circuit's rejection in Harris of an extension of judi-
cial immunity beyond the "judicial acts" limitation of Sparkman is a
necessary conclusion. Exceptions to the judicial acts requirement as a
basis for absolute judicial immunity would substantially undercut the
policy which underlies the doctrine of judical immunity-the elimina-
tion of vexing litigation for acts taken in a judicial capacity.' "4 How-
ever, the Seventh Circuit's treatment of Barr v. Ma/leo was more
conclusory than analytical and may have confused the issue by declin-
107. Id at 336.
108. 360 U.S. 564 (1959).
109. 398 F.2d 23 (7th Cir. 1968).




114. See text accompanying note 62 supra.
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ing to clearly do away with Barr as a basis for the extension of absolute
immunity from liability under section 1983.
First, it should be pointed out that the immunity portion of the
Barr opinion was not adopted by a majority of the Supreme Court." 1
5
Justice Harlan's opinion in Barr v. Matteo was joined by Justices
Frankfurter, Clark and Whittaker. 16 Justice Black concurred in the
outcome of the case but did not specifically address the immunity is-
sue." 7 Thus, the discussion of immunity in the Harlan opinion has
limited precedential value.
In addition, it is important to note that Barr v. Matteo was decided
in 1959, long before the doctrine of qualified immunity had been fully
developed. The reasoning of the Barr opinion is premised upon the
propriety of extending absolute immunity to executive officers because
of the discretion inherent in such offices.' 8 This reasoning was clearly
rejected in subsequent cases involving claims of absolute immunity for
state executive officers' '9 and even quasi-judicial officers.'
20
The Supreme Court in Butz v. Economou 12 1 made clear that
whatever residual validity remains in the doctrine enunciated in Barr v.
Matteo is limited to libel actions for officials who act within the scope
of their authority. Barr v. Maatteo is simply inapplicable to cases in-
volving allegations of the denial of constitutional rights.
The distinction made by the court in Harris focused on the fact
that Harris involved a state official and that Barr involved a federal
officer. This distinction is not terribly helpful in explaining why the
immunity doctrine in Barr should not be applied to the facts in Harris.
It has been recognized for some time that distinctions between state
and federal officials for purposes of establishing liability for the denial
of civil rights would be incongruous. The Supreme Court has also
made clear that, absent an expression of congressional intent to the
contrary, there is no reason for according a different degree of immu-
nity to federal officials than that accorded state officials.
As a result, the panel would have been on firmer ground in clearly
rejecting the claim of absolute immunity based upon Sparkman and
Butz. Since judicial immunity applies only to those acts which are
115. 360 U.S. 564 (1959).
116. Id
117. Id at 576-78 (Black, J., concurring).
118. Id at 573.
119. Eg., Scheuer v. Rhodes, 416 U.S. 232 (1974).
120. E.g., Wood v. Strickland, 420 U.S. 408 (1975).
121. 438 U.S. 478 (1978).
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"normally performed by a judge," the actions of the judge in Harris
could hardly be the subject of absolute judicial immunity. Such acts
are not subject to judicial immunity precisely because they are outside
the scope of the judge's authority. Once that authority has been ex-
ceeded neither Barr, Sparkman nor Butz supports the notion that some
other form of immunity would arise. Even qualified immunity applies
only to those acts within the scope of an official's authority.
Reliance upon the "scope of authority" test, as defined by Spark-
man, would have provided a bright line test which would eliminate the
ambiguities inherent in the "protection of the court" language bor-
rowed from Barr. The suggestion in Harris that there may be a basis
for a claim of good faith qualified immunity for constitutional viola-
tions arising from extra-judicial acts taken in "protection of the court"
can only lead to confusion in the judicial immunity doctrine and pro-
vides an unnecessary invitation to further litigation.
PRISONER'S RIGHTS
Among the cases concerning the rights of prisoners decided by the
Seventh Circuit in the 1979-80 term,122 three decisions interpreted the
bounds of the liberty interests entitling convicted prisoners and pretrial
detainees to constitutional due process recently defined by the United
States Supreme Court. While closely following Supreme Court rulings
which narrowly defined the constitutional rights of pretrial detainees
and prisoners seeking parole, 23 the Seventh Circuit continued to fol-
low a more liberal approach to determining the due process rights of
inmates subjected to disciplinary action in prison. 1
24
Stringer v. Rowe
In Stringer v. Rowe, 25 the Seventh Circuit reversed an order
granting summary judgment dismissing apro se suit by an inmate al-
leging violation of his constitutional rights by prison officials in the
course of disciplinary actions. Stringer had been placed in disciplinary
segregation and subsequently transferred to another prison without be-
ing afforded a hearing. 126 Stringer also complained that he was unnec-
122. Trapnell v. Riggsby, 622 F.2d 290 (7th Cir. 1980); Averhart v. Tutsie, 618 F.2d 479 (7th
Cir. 1980); Stringer v. Rowe, 616 F.2d 993 (7th Cir. 1980); Jordan v. Wolke, 615 F.2d 749 (7th Cir.
1980).
123. Averhart v. Tutsie, 618 F.2d 479 (7th Cir. 1980); Jordan v. Wolke, 615 F.2d 749 (7th Cir.
1980).
124. Trapnell v. Riggsby, 622 F.2d 290 (7th Cir. 1980).
125. 616 F.2d 993 (7th Cir. 1980).
126. Id at 994.
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essarily sprayed in the face with mace by prison officers in violation of
his eighth amendment rights and, further, that prison officials failed to
deliver to him some of his personal papers after transfer, giving rise to
a claim under section 1983.127
The district court, which did not address the issue of whether "the
placement of Stringer in disciplinary segregation infringed a liberty in-
terest protected by the Due Process Clause,"'' 28 dismissed the pro se
complaint for failure to challenge the disciplinary procedures em-
ployed. Giving Stringer's complaint a liberal reading, the Seventh Cir-
cuit concluded that it sufficiently alleged that prison regulation AR804
created a right not to be placed in segregation absent a finding of seri-
ous misconduct. 129 Since the district court had not recognized that a
regulation may create entitlement to due process and because the de-
fendant did not address the issue, the case was remanded for further
proceedings. The district court was also ordered to appoint counsel for
the plaintiff. 130
In suggesting that AR804 might establish a liberty interest enti-
tling an inmate to the protection of the due process clause, the court
followed its previous holdings which liberally interpreted the Supreme
Court's decision in Meachum v. Fano. 31 Meachum rejected the "griev-
ous loss" theory previously developed in the Seventh Circuit, which
required that due process be afforded prisoners in every instance of
substantial deprivation. Declaring that conviction extinguished a pris-
oner's liberty interest as derived from the Constitution, the Court con-
cluded that due process rights held by convicted prisoners are only
those which are created by the state "by statute, by rule or regula-
tion." ' 32 Despite the sources listed, the Court looked only to statute
and did not analyze the circumstances in Meachum in order to discern
whether policy or practice provided sufficient expectation to establish a
liberty interest. 133 The Seventh Circuit, however, subsequently focused
on the language which broadened the inquiry: "[tihe predicate neces-
127. Id at 995.
128. Id at 996.
129. Id The text of Administrative Regulation 804 is set out in the Appendix to the opinion.
130. Id at 1001. In ordering the district court to appoint counsel the Seventh Circuit made
known its view that the suit was not frivolous and raised serious factual disputes. "By appointing
counsel in cases such as this one, the district court not only insures that the meritorious claims of a
civil rights pro se plaintiff are not defeated, but eases the burdens placed both on the district court
and on this court when the plaintiff has filed an inartfully drawn and arguably incomplete com-
plaint." Id
131. 427 U.S. 215 (1976).
132. Id at 229.
133. Id See Comment, Two Views of a Prisoner's Right to Due Process.- Meachum v. Fano, 12
HARV. Civ. R. Civ. LIB. L. REV. 405, 415 (1977).
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sary to trigger the Due Process Clause is not restricted to statutorily-
created rights; it may also be found in official policies or practices."1
34
As indicated by A verhart v. Tutsie, 35 due process protections are
not available in the context of prerelease parole board proceedings ab-
sent express statutory directives limiting the parole board's discretion.
The Seventh Circuit, however, apparently takes a different view of due
process requirements in disciplinary actions within the institution and
finds that sufficient basis for such rights may be created by internal
rules, guidelines, policies and practices. 3 6 Thus, Stringer was re-
manded to the district court to determine whether prison regulation
AR804 created a right to be free from disciplinary segregation absent a
finding of serious misconduct.
37
A verhart P. Tutsie
Application of the restrictive interpretation of the liberty interests
of prisoners recently adopted by the United States Supreme Court 38 is
presented by A verhart v. Tutsie.' 39 Plaintiffs challenged the procedures
for parole release determinations of the Indiana Parole Board as viola-
tive of the due process clause of the fourteenth amendment and of their
rights under the Indiana Administrative Adjustment Act (A.A.A.).1
40
The Seventh Circuit upheld the district court's determination that the
parole procedure satisfied due process and that the A.A.A. did not ap-
ply to parole board proceedings.
Following Greenholtz v. Nebraska Penal Inmates, 14 the Seventh
Circuit stated that an inmate does not have a protectible expectation of
134. Durso v. Rowe, 579 F.2d 1365, 1369 (7th Cir. 1978), cert. denied, 439 U.S. 1121 (1979).
135. See text accompanying notes 138-44 infra.
136. See, e.g., Stringer v. Rowe, 616 F.2d 993 (7th Cir. 1980); Arsberry v. Sielaff, 586 F.2d 37
(7th Cir. 1978); Durso v. Rowe, 579 F.2d 1365 (7th Cir. 1978), cert. denied, 439 U.S. 1121 (1979).
137. 616 F.2d at 999. With respect to the eighth amendment claim the court adopted the view
recently expressed by the Ninth Circuit that the use of chemical agents to subdue individual in-
mates, as distinguished from large disturbances, is "justified only under narrowly defined circum-
stances." Id As part of that justification, defendants bear the burden of explaining why lesser
measures could not have been used. Id at 1000. In addition to finding inconsistencies in defend-
ants' reports concerning the macing incident which created genuine issues of material facts, the
court noted that defendants had failed to disclose any facts regarding the reasonableness of the use
of mace under the circumstances. Id at 999-1000.
Dismissal of the remaining claim concerning Stringer's lost papers was affirmed on the
grounds that requisite to a section 1983 claim is a showing that the actions of the prison officials
resulting in plaintiffs loss were either intentional or in reckless disregard for plaintiff's rights. Id
at 1000. The court found that the conduct alleged amounted to no more than negligence and thus
was insufficient to establish a section 1983 claim. Id
138. See, e.g., Greenholtz v. Nebraska Penal Inmates, 442 U.S. 1 (1979).
139. 618 F.2d 479 (7th Cir. 1980).
140. IND. CODE § 4-22-1-1 (1976).
141. 442 U.S. 1 (1979).
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parole unless that expectation is expressly created by state statute. 42
Since "a validly obtained conviction . . . extinguishes a convict's lib-
erty interest in release," the state had no obligation to offer any kind of
parole system.' 43 Moreover, even where such a system is created, the
mere possibility of parole does not create a protectible expectation. To
create such an interest "the state statute must be phrased in such a way
that it creates a real expectation of and not just a unilateral hope for
parole." ,44
In Greenholtz, the Supreme Court found that the Nebraska statute
limited the parole board's discretion by expressly mandating parole
under defined circumstances. Such limitations, the Court reasoned,
created a sufficient expectation. The Seventh Circuit held, however,
that the Indiana statute imposed no such limitation on the board's dis-
cretion in release determination. Moreover, while the Supreme Court
was required to interpret independently the Nebraska statute since the
state courts had not yet done so, the Seventh Circuit adopted the deci-
sion of the Indiana Supreme Court which expressly distinguished the
Indiana and Nebraska statutes and held that the Indiana "parole re-
lease statute creates no expectancy of release . . . our Legislature has
invested the Parole Board with almost total discretion in such mat-
ters." 145
Jordan v. Wolke
In Jordan v. Wolke,' 46 the Seventh Circuit reversed the District
Court for the Eastern District of Wisconsin, which had issued an in-
junction prohibiting the overcrowding of pretrial detainees at the Mil-
waukee County Jail and requiring that detainees be allowed contact
visitation with family members. Pretrial detainees are persons charged
142. 618 F.2d at 480-81.
143. Id..
144. Id at 481.
145. Id, citing Murphy v. Indiana Parole Bd., 397 N.E.2d 259 (Ind. 1979).
146. 615 F.2d 749. Eighty per cent of the inmates at Milwaukee County Jail (MCJ) were
detainees. They were housed in eleven cellblocks consisting of five cells, a corridor and a day
room. Each cell, which measured nine feet by ten feet, contained two double bunk beds plus a
toilet and a sink. The area per inmate in each cellblock was 59 square feet. The American Cor-
rectional Association standard is 50 square feet per inmate in the cell and 35 square feet in the day
room, totalling approximately 85 square feet, almost twice that of the Milwaukee County Jail.
The majority criticized the district court injunction mandating a minimum space of 118.5 square
feet per inmate, including the corridor, on grounds that it far exceeded the American Correctional
Association standard of 85 square feet. The court neglected to note, however, that the latter did
not include corridor space which accounts for 20 square feet per inmate.
The district court injunction also required that the institution replace the visiting facilities,
which are arranged so that inmates and visitors are separated by a plexiglass window, with facili-
ties, which permit contact visitation.
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with crimes who are confined because they do not qualify for release on
bail or on their own recognizance. Applying its interpretation of the
standard set down by the Supreme Court in Bell v. Wolfish, 14 7 the Sev-
enth Circuit ruled that neither condition amounted to "punishment"
and, thus, did not offend the Constitution. "
4
In Wolfish, the Supreme Court reasoned that a detainee awaiting
trial does not have a constitutional right not to be confined prior to trial
if detention is necessary to assure his presence at trial.149 Further, the
Court held that once the detainee is confined, his liberty interest ex-
tends only to the right not to be punished. 50 That right, however, is
confined by the narrow concept of "punishment" adopted by the ma-
jority opinion. Rejecting the compelling necessity standard applied by
the Second Circuit, the Court ruled that only conditions and regula-
tions which are intentionally punitive or which are excessive in relation
to legitimate purposes are to be condemned.' 5 ' The majority, which
was sharply criticized by three of the dissenting justices, 152 found none
of the conditions or practices complained of to be excessive relative to
the institutional interests served.
53
The harshness of the Wofish holding, however, did not dictate the
same result in Jordan. The living conditions at the Milwaukee County
Jail were considerably more crowded and oppressive than those chal-
lenged in Wolfish.54 Moreover, while detainees in Wolfish complained
of body cavity searches following contact visits regardless of probable
cause, detainees in Jordan were denied contact visitation altogether. 55
147. 441 U.S. 520 (1979).
148. 615 F.2d at 753.
149. 441 U.S. at 535.
150. Id.
151. Id at 535-40.
152. Separate dissenting opinions were written by Justice Marshall and Justice Stevens, Justice
Brennan concurring. Commentaries have also criticized the opinion of the Court. See, e.g., The
Supreme Court, 1978 Term. Conditions of Confinementfor Pretrial Detainees, 93 HARV. L. REV. 99
(1979).
153. 441 U.S. at 542.
154. Judge Swygert, dissenting in Jordan, charged that differences between the two institu-
tions were substantial. Both institutions contained 20 inmates to a unit. However, the Metropoli-
tan Correctional Center (MCC) at issue in Wolfish housed only two inmates per cell as compared
to four at MCJ. Moreover, the rooms at MCC contained more than l1h times the space per occu-
pant as compared to MCJ. Further, detainees at MCC had access every day to a common room
which contained "recreational and exercise equipment, telephones, color television sets [and]
books." 615 F.2d at 754 (Swygert, J., dissenting). Milwaukee facility day rooms contained only
"a table and a television set. The detainees are confined to their cell blocks except for two hours
per week for recreation and visiting." Id (emphasis added). The dissenting opinion also makes
note of the substantial amenities in the modem design of the MCC which are totally lacking at
MCJ. See also note 146 supra.
155. 615 F.2d at 751.
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As noted by Judge Swygert in his dissent, despite the deference ac-
corded prison officials under Wolfish, the conditions in Jordan were
burdensome enough to permit a finding that they were excessive rela-
tive to the purposes allegedly served. 156 The majority, however, sum-
marily rejected the view that the factual circumstances warranted a
different result.
The majority gave no deference whatsoever to the testimony of
experts who described the debilitating and damaging effects of the al-
leged deprivations on detainees. 5 7 By failing to recognize the punitive
character of these conditions, particularly in the instance of visitation
rights, which could be administratively cured without much difficulty,
the Seventh Circuit has further narrowed the concept of "punishment."
Virtually all scrutiny is abandoned in the presence of minimal rational-
ization. Because of the extreme deference given institutional interests,
confinement alone without conviction extinguishes virtually all expec-
tation of liberty. By interpreting Wolfish more restrictively than the
opinion requires, the Seventh Circuit gives credence to the notion that
the courts will hesitate to infer the presence of impermissible punish-
ment unless faced with a case of "loading a detainee with chains and
shackles and throwing him in a dungeon."'' 58
TITLE VII
During 1979-80 the Seventh Circuit heard appeals involving both
procedural and substantive issues in a large number of cases brought
under Title VII of the Civil Rights Act. 159 For the most part these deci-
sions were routine determinations; those of particular note are dis-
cussed below.
Of significance in the realm of procedure, the Seventh Circuit, in
Grayson v. Wickes Corp., joined the Fourth, Fifth, Sixth and Ninth
156. On the issue of overcrowding the court stated simply: "We do not see a material distinc-
tion between the facts in Wolfish and the facts in the case at bar." 615 F.2d at 753. With respect to
contact visitation the court reasoned that since the Supreme Court in Wofish upheld body cavity
searches after contact visitation as reasonable, it could not say that it was not preferable to ban
contact visitation altogether so that such searches would be unnecessary. Id at 754. The Seventh
Circuit did not recognize any distinction in the character of the two deprivations. The authors
believe that it is unreasonable to conclude that contact visitation necessarily requires body cavity
searches. Other less onerous security measures could be taken, such as keeping a guard present
during visitation and screening visitors for metal objects and packages.
157. 615 F.2d at 756 (Swygert, J., dissenting). The majority in both Wolfish and Jordan made
much of the temporary nature of the detention in order to rationalize the harshness of the result.
441 U.S. at 536, 526 n.3; 615 F.2d at 756. There is, however, no doctrine which allows constitu-
tional deprivations merely because they are of brief duration.
158. 441 U.S. at 539 n.20.
159. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e (1976).
CIVIL LIBERTIES
Circuits in holding that jury trials need not be provided in Title VII
suits.' 60 The court also ruled that dismissal of an action brought by the
EEOC on grounds of laches requires a showing of both inexcusable
delay on the part of the EEOC and material prejudice to the defendant
as a result of the Commission's delay.' 6 1 In Eirhart v. Libbey-Owens-
Ford Co. ,I62 the court determined that a consent decree entered into
with the EEOC is not a "written interpretation or opinion of the Com-
mission" entitling defendant to immunity from suit in another jurisdic-
tion under section 713(b) of the Civil Rights Act. 163 Finally, in a case
of first impression, the court ruled that rule 68 of the Federal Rules of
Civil Procedure should be given a liberal construction in Title VII
cases. 164 The unique interpretation given rule 68 in August v. Delta Air
160. 607 F.2d 1194 (7th Cir. 1979). See Slack v. Havens, 522 F.2d 1091 (9th Cir. 1975); EEOC
v. Detroit Edison Co., 515 F.2d 301 (6th Cir. 1975); Robinson v. Lorillard Corp., 444 F.2d 791 (4th
Cir.), ceri. dismissed, 404 U.S. 1006 (1971); Johnson v. Georgia Highway Express, Inc., 417 F.2d
1122 (5th Cir. 1969).
161. EEOC v. Massey-Ferguson, Inc., 622 F.2d 271 (7th Cir. 1980). In another action, the
court held that failure of the EEOC to act promptly on a charge filed with the Commission does
not create an actionable wrong since delay by the Commission does not bar plaintiff's cause of
action but rather gives plaintiff the alternative of seeking private enforcement. Stewart v. EEOC,
611 F.2d 679 (7th Cir. 1979). The pertinent provisions of the Equal Employment Opportunity
Act, (42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(b) and 5(0(1) (1976)) provide:
[T]he Commission shall serve a notice of the charge [to the respondent] . . . within ten
days, and shall make an investigation thereof. . . . The Commission shall make its de-
termination on reasonable cause as promptly as possible and, so far as practicable, not
later than one hundred and twenty days from the filing-of the charge. . . . If a charge
filed with the Commission . . . is dismissed . . . or if within one hundred and eighty
days from the filing of such charge or the expiration of any period of reference ....
whichever is later, the Commission has not filed a civil action under this section. . . , or
the Commission has not entered into a conciliation agreement to which the person ag-
grieved is a party, the Commission . . . shall so notify the person aggrieved and within
ninety days after the giving of such notice a civil action may be brought against the
respondent named in the charge (A) by the person claiming to be aggrieved, or (B) if
such charge was filed by a member of the Commission, by any person whom the charge
alleges was aggrieved by the alleged unlawful employment practice.
162. 616 F.2d 278 (7th Cir. 1980).
163. Section 713(b) (42 U.S.C. § 2000e-12 (1976)) provides, in pertinent part:
(b) In any action or proceeding based on any alleged unlawful employment practice, no
person shall be subject to any liability or punishment for or on account of (1) the cdm-
mission by such person of an unlawful employment practice if he pleads and proves that
the act or omission complained of was in good faith, in conformity with, and in reliance
on any written interpretation or opinion of the Commission ....
164. See August v. Delta Air Lines, Inc., 600 F.2d 699 (7th Cir. 1979), aff'd, 49 U.S.L.W. 4241
(U.S. Mar. 9, 1981). FED. R. Civ. P. 68 provides:
At any time more than 10 days before the trial begins, a party defending against a claim
may serve upon the adverse party an offer to allow judgment to be taken against him for
the money or property or to the effect specified in his offer, with costs then accrued. If
within 10 days after the service of the offer the adverse party serves written notice that
the offer is accepted, either party may then file the offer and notice of acceptance to-
gether with proof of service thereof and thereupon the clerk shall enter judgment. An
offer not accepted shall be deemed withdrawn and evidence thereof is not admissible
except in a proceeding to deterinine costs. If the judgment finally obtained by the offeree
is not more favorable than the offer, the offeree must pay the costs incurred after the
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Lines, Inc. 165 merits further discussion.
Rejecting an argument that rule 68 mandates in every instance an
award of costs to the defendant if the final judgment obtained by the
plaintiff is not more favorable than defendant's offer, the Seventh Cir-
cuit has determined that, at least in Title VII cases, the trial judge may
exercise discretion in allowing costs. 166 In August v. Delta Air Lines,
Inc., the court reasoned that rule 68 operates only in favor of those
who make good faith offers of settlement.
67
In August, defendant had made a settlement offer of $450 during
the initial stages of discovery, four months after the suit was com-
menced. Plaintiff, who was seeking in excess of $20,000 in back pay for
an allegedly discriminatory firing, rejected the offer. Over a year later,
the trial court entered judgment for the defendant and ordered each
party to bear its own costs of litigation. 68 Defendant's motion for costs
incurred after the date of the rule 68 offer was denied on the grounds
that defendant's minimal offer was neither reasonable nor made in
good faith and, thus, did not constitute an effective offer.
169
In the only two cases to consider the issue of whether application
of rule 68 is discretionary, the courts adhered to a literal construction of
the mandatory language. 70 Without giving any consideration to ele-
ments of good faith or the reasonableness of a rule 68 offer, the district
court in Dual v. Cleland awarded costs to the defendant in a Title VII
suit, concluding that the "plain language of the rule eliminates the
Court's discretion." '' The Dual court relied primarily on the analysis
making of the offer. The fact that an offer is made but not accepted does not preclude a
subsequent offer. When the liability of one party to another has been determined by
verdict or order or judgment, but the amount or extent of the liability remains to be
determined by further proceedings, the party adjudged liable may make an offer of judg-
ment, which shall have the same effect as an offer made before tnal if it is served within a
reasonable time not less than 10 days prior to the commencement of hearings to deter-
mine the amount or extent of liability.
165. 600 F.2d 699 (7th Cir. 1979), aff'd on other grounds, 49 U.S.L.W. 4241 (U.S. Mar. 9,
1981).
166. 600 F.2d at 702.
167. Id
168. Id at 700.
169. The Seventh Circuit set out in a footnote the relevant portion of the trial judge's opinion.
See 600 F.2d at 700 n.3. Defendant's offer here might also have been considered defective under
the reasoning of Scheriffv. Beck, 452 F. Supp. 1254 (D. Colo. 1978), in which the court held that a
rule 68 offer to be valid in civil rights cases must include payment of accrued attorneys' fees
because attorneys' fees in such cases constitute part of the costs. The terms of the offer here are
somewhat ambiguous; it is unclear whether the offer of $450 was to include or to be in addition to
attorneys' fees. The trial judge's opinion suggests the latter and notes that the sum was probably
insufficient to have covered plaintiff's accrued costs.
170. Dual v. Cleland, 79 F.R.D. 696 (D. D.C. 1978); Mr' Hanger, Inc. v. Cut Rate Plastic
Hangers, Inc., 63 F.R.D. 607 (E.D. N.Y. 1974).
171. 79 F.R.D. at 697.
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in Mr. Hanger, Inc. v. Cut Rate Plastic Hangers, Inc. ,172 in which an
unsuccessful plaintiff in a patent suit was assessed defendant's costs af-
ter rejecting its rule 68 offer. Reasoning that rule 68 is to be distin-
guished from rule 54(d) 173 which allows discretion in awarding costs to
the prevailing party, the Hanger court based its conclusion that rule 68
is non-discretionary both on the language of the rule itself and on the
language modifying rule 54(d). 174 As the Seventh Circuit conceded, the
argument has some force because infusion of discretion into rule 68
awards would create some overlap with rule 54(d).
175
Nevertheless, the Seventh Circuit concluded that a literal applica-
tion of the rule in cases where the offer is a sham would defeat the
purpose of rule 68, which is to encourage settlements, 76 as well as de-
feat the purpose of the counsel fee provisions of the Civil Rights Act,
which is to encourage injured parties to seek judicial relief.177 The
court noted that rather than encouraging negotiated settlements be-
tween litigants, "a minimal rule 68 offer made in bad faith could be-
come a routine practice by defendants seeking cheap insurance against
costs.' 1 78 Further, automatic application of the rule would thwart the
national policy embodied in Title VII by discouraging rather than en-
couraging individuals injured by racial discrimination to seek judicial
relief. 179 Concluding that a liberal reading of rule 68 is justified in Title
VII cases the court held:
In a Title VII case the trial judge may exercise his discretion and
allow costs under Rule 68 when, viewed as of the time of the offer
along with consideration of the final outcome of the case, the offer
can be seen to have been made in good faith and to have had some
reasonable relationship.in amount to the issues, litigation risks, and
expenses anticipated and involved in the case.' 80
The Seventh Circuit also decided three cases that dealt with the
172. 63 F.R.D. 607 (E.D. N.Y. 1974). Although plaintiff in Hanger raised the issue of the
reasonableness of the defendant's $25 offer, the court rejected the claim.
173. FED. R. Civ. P. 54(d) provides in pertinent part:
(d) Costs. Except when express provision therefor is made either in a statute of the
United States or in these rules, costs shall be allowed as of course to the prevailing party
unless the court otherwise directs ...
174. 63 F.R.D. at 610-11.
175. 600 F.2d at 701.
176. Id See, e.g., Staffend v. Lake Central Airlines, Inc., 47 F.R.D. 218 (N.D. Ohio 1969); 7
MOORE's FEDERAL PRACTICE 68.02 (2d ed. 1979).
177. 600 F.2d at 701.
178. Id
179. Id
180. Id at 702. On appeal, the Supreme Court held that it was unnecessary to read a reasona-
bleness requirement into rule 68. The Court stated that in addressing the issue of reasonable or
sham offers the Seventh Circuit had not confronted "the threshhold question" whether rule 68
applies at all to the situation where judgment is entered in favor of the defendant-offeror. The
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sufficiency of plaintiffs' claims of discrimination under Title VII. In
Minkus v. Metropolitan Sanitary District, I8 the district court dismissed
a suit by an orthodox Jew whose religious practices precluded him
from taking a competency exam which defendant administered only on
Saturday. Reversing summary judgment and remanding for further
proceedings, the Seventh Circuit reaffirmed its earlier holding that
"whether an employer can reasonably accomodate a person's religious
beliefs without undue hardship 'is basically a question of fact.'"182
Summary judgment for defendant was also reversed in Carroll v.
Talman Federal Savings & Loan Association, s183 where the district court
had determined that imposition of a dress code on female employees
but not on male employees did not constitute discrimination under sec-
tion 703(a)(2) because no employment opportunity was denied.' 84 The
Seventh Circuit held that the dress code violated section 703(a)(1) be-
cause it was discriminatory with respect to the "compensation, terms,
conditions, or privileges of employment."'
' 85
In Holder v. Old Ben Coal Co. '186 the court affirmed a district court
ruling that the plaintiff had failed to establish a prima facie case of sex
discrimination because she had failed to prove that she was qualified
for an unskilled job. Under McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. Green, 8 7 lack
of qualifications bars an inference of discrimination; therefore, defend-
ant was not required to show a non-discriminatory reason for not hir-
ing plaintiff. In reaching its conclusion, however, the Seventh Circuit
infused the term "unskilled" with notions of minimal skills which the
defendant had not described at the time plaintiff applied either in its
advertising or in its collective bargaining agreement.
88
Court concluded that such a judgment is not a "judgment obtained by the offeree" and thus is not
covered by rule 68. 49 U.S.L.W. 4241, 4242.
181. 600 F.2d 80 (7th Cir. 1979).
182. Id at 81, citing Redmond v. GAF Corp., 574 F.2d 897, 902 (7th Cir. 1978).
183. 604 F.2d 1028 (7th Cir. 1979), cert. denied, 445 U.S. 929 (1980).
184. Id at 1029. Section 703(a) (42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(a) (1976)) provides:
(a) It shall be an unlawful employment practice for an employer-
(1) to fail or refuse to hire or to discharge any individual, or otherwise to discrimi-
nate against any individual with respect to his compensation, terms, conditions, or privi-
leges of employment, because of such individual's race, color, religion, sex, or national
origin; or (2) to limit, segregate, or classify his employees or applicants for employment
in any way which would deprive or tend to deprive any individual of employment op-
portunities or otherwise adversely affect his status as an employee, because of such indi-
vidual's race, color, religion, sex, or national origin.
185. 604 F.2d at 1033. See note 233 infra.
186. 618 F.2d 1198 (7th Cir. 1980).
187. 411 U.S. 792, 802 (1973).
188. 618 F.2d at 1200. Plaintiff had applied for two jobs labeled "unskilled" at defendant strip
mining company: general laborer and truck driver. The company did not announce any skill
requirements, nor did the union contract state any qualifications although explicit qualifications
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By establishing its own definition of minimal qualifications for
"unskilled" jobs, the court went far beyond the burden of proof set
forth in McDonnell Douglas or Teamsters v. United States, I8 9 upon
which it relied. In Teamsters, the Supreme Court stated that as part of
his or her burden, plaintiff must show that rejection did not result from
"an absolute or relative lack of qualifications." 190 This Holder did: she
applied for a position designated "unskilled" and established that she
lacked none of the skills required.' 91 The Seventh Circuit, however,
misconstrued the procedural requirement to mean that plaintiff must
show not only that she was qualified but also that defendant did not
"prefer" more experienced or better qualified applicants. Thus, the
court shifted the entire burden of showing that defendant had no legiti-
mate reason for preferring the male applicants to the Title VII plaintiff.
Since defendant was never put to its proof, the court made its own
determination of defendant's legitimate reasons for rejecting plaintiff.
There is ample indication from the opinion that the court considered
plaintiffs prior training and experience as a beautician not only unre-
lated to but antithetical to qualifications for an unskilled job at a
mine.' 92 Putting aside the issue of whether such an inference by the
court is appropriate absent an objective definition of qualifications
from the defendant, the court's reasoning disregards the fact that all
work experience imparts skills and capabilities. This is not to say that
an employer may not prefer specific kinds of work experience. 193 Such
preferences, however, should be made known to applicants at the out-
set to dispel any inference of discrimination. The burden at trial, how-
ever, should remain on the defendant to show that its actions were
explained by legitimate preferences. The court should not, as it did in
Holder, supply its own conclusions about such preferences because ju-
dicial procedure, the safeguard of fairness, is subverted in the process.
SCHOOL DESEGREGATION
The Seventh Circuit considered three important school desegrega-
tion cases during the 1979-80 term. In a decision recently vacated and
remanded by the United States Supreme Court, the Seventh Circuit
were listed for skilled jobs. Plaintiff, who had attended high school and a beauty college, had
some work experience in a small factory and had briefly driven a truck. Most of her work experi-
ence was as a beautician. Id at 1198-1200.
189. 431 U.S. 324 (1977).
190. 431 U.S. at 358 n.44.
191. See 618 F.2d at 1203-04 (Swygert, J., dissenting).
192. Id at 1199, 1201-03.
193. See Pond v. Braniff Airways, Inc., 500 F.2d 161 (5th Cir. 1974).
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held that black students who were denied admission to their neighbor-
hood schools because of racial quotas voluntarily imposed to prevent de
facto segregation were not deprived of any right under federal law., 
94
Reviewing challenges to the Indianapolis school desegregation plan,
the court adopted a standard for determining segregative intent, which
is required in race discrimination cases under the fourteenth amend-
ment. 95 Finally, in a case of first impression, the court reviewed the
standard to be applied when reviewing challenges to desegregation
plans adopted pursuant to a settlement or consent decree. 1
96
Johnson v. Board of Education
A new variation on the challenge to school desegregation plans
was presented by Johnson v. Board of Education .197 The plaintiffs,
black high school students who had been refused admission to their
Chicago neighborhood schools and voluntarily bused to other schools
as part of the implementation of a school desegregation plan, chal-
lenged the plan on the grounds that it violated the Illinois School
Code' 98 and the equal protection clause of the fourteenth amend-
ment. 199
The unique posture of the case reflects the division of opinion with
respect to the wisdom of busing as a remedy for racial discrimination in
public schools. 2°° The irony of Johnson is that the plan is challenged
194. Johnson v. Board of Educ., 604 F.2d 504 (7th Cir. 1979), vacated and remanded, 49
U.S.L.W. 3298 (Oct. 20, 1980). Certiorari had been granted by the Supreme Court in July. Subse-
quently, the Chicago School Board announced its decision to drop the Plan. On the basis of
respondents' suggestion that the issue was thus mooted, the Supreme Court vacated the Seventh
Circuit opinion and remanded the case for consideration of mootness.
195. United States v. Board of School Comm'rs, No. 79-1875 (7th Cir. April 29, 1980).
196. Armstrong v. Board of School Directors, 616 F.2d 305 (7th Cir. 1980).
197. 604 F.2d 504 (7th Cir. 1979), vacated and remanded, 101 S. Ct. 339 (1980).
198. ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 122, § 34-18 (1975), provides in pertinent part:
The board shall exercise general supervision and management of the public education
and the public school system of the city, and shall have power:
7. To divide the city into sub-districts and apportion the pupils to the several schools,
but no pupil shall be excluded from or segregated in any such school on account of his
color, race, sex, or nationality. The board shall, as soon as practicable, and from time to
time thereafter, change or revise existing sub-districts or create new sub-districts in a
manner which will take into consideration the prevention of segregation and the elimina-
tion of separation of children in public schools because of color, race, sex or national-
ity . ..
199. 604 F.2d at 507. Plaintiffs had sought both declaratory judgment and injunctive relief.
200. While calling for commitment to equal access to quality education, both blacks and
whites have challenged reliance on busing plans as a means of achieving that goal. See, e.g., Bell,
Brown v. Board of Education and the Interest-Convergence Dilemma, 93 HARv. L. REV. 518 (1980);
Armor, White Flight, Demographic Transition, and the Future of School Desegregation (1978)
(Rand Paper Series, The Rand Corp.).
Concern over the possible negative effects of extensive busing was recently expressed by Jus-
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by members of the very class harmed by past discrimination.
In 1975, the Chicago Board of Education adopted the "Student
Racial Stabilization Plan" (Plan) in an effort to arrest the trend toward
segregated enrollments and overcrowding at two public high schools,
Gage Park and Morgan Park, on the south side of Chicago.20 Under
the Plan, racial quotas with respect to admission were established at the
two schools, and selection of incoming students was determined by lot-
tery within each racial group. 20 2 Students who were excluded under
the quotas were offered the choice of attending an "under-utilized"
school.203 Of the eighteen high schools which were designated "under-
utilized" and thus available to students excluded under the Plan, only
six had significant white enrollments and all of them were located on
the north side of Chicago.
2°4
At the time the Plan was adopted there were more white students
than black students in the targeted attendance area. Since that time the
white enrollment has declined substantially.205 As a result, no white
student has ever been denied admission to Gage Park or Morgan Park,
but hundreds of black and Hispanic students have been denied admis-
sion.206 Plaintiffs alleged that the quota system on its face constituted
illegal discrimination under both state and federal law. In addition,
plaintiffs contended that since no white student was ever denied admis-
sion, the Plan was constitutionally deficient because the entire burden
of desegregation was placed upon the black students.
20 7
The court found none of the plaintiffs' arguments persuasive. Re-
viewing the Illinois School Code,20 8 the court found that while the stat-
ute appeared on its face to prohibit consideration of race as a basis for
tice Powell, dissenting from the Court's dismissal of certiorari in Estes v. Metropolitan Branches,
Dallas NAACP, 444 U.S. 437, 438 (1980): "It is increasingly evident that use of the busing rem-
edy to achieve racial balance can conflict with the goals of equal educational opportunity and
quality schools."
As the eventuality of Congressional action to prohibit mandatory busing becomes more cer-
tain, the authors believe that alternatives to busing must be developed to assure that the goal is not
discarded with the remedy.
201. 604 F.2d at 507-08.
202. Id at 510-11. The quotas were 48% black, 42% white, 8% Hispanic and 2% principal's
option at Gage Park, and 50% black and 50% white at Morgan Park. Id.
203. Id at 512.
204. Id The closest alternative schools were I I and 18 miles away from the southside schools.
Id. Under the original plans, students were required to use public transportation to reach the
under-utilized schools; however, upon the suggestion of the court the Board modified the plans
and provided buses for the students. Id at 513.
205. Id at 509-13.
206. Id at 511-12.
207. Id at 518.
208. See note 198 supra.
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excluding any pupil from a particular school, the statute also empow-
ered the Board to revise attendance areas in order to prevent segrega-
tion.20 9 Reconciling both statutory objectives, the court "decline[d] to
ascribe to the statute a prohibition inconsistent with its underlying pur-
poses ... "210
Next, the court turned to the constitutional claim. As a threshold
matter the court noted that the challenged Plan did not involve a fun-
damental right since no constitutional right to attend a particular
school had ever been recognized by the courts.21' The Plan, however,
did rest on racial classifications which, in the court's view, mandated
strict scrutiny regardless of whether the classification was "benign.
' 21 2
Applying the dual compelling state interest-least restrictive alternative
means test, 213 the Seventh Circuit upheld the Plan. In the court's view
the interest of the state in alleviating overcrowding and preventing seg-
regation was compelling. 214 Considering the second prong of the test,
the court determined that defendant had adequately shown that the
Plan was necessary to stabilize the integrated character of the
schools. 2
15
In reaching its conclusion, the Seventh Circuit found ample sup-
port in the school desegregation cases of the 1970s in which the
Supreme Court approved remedies involving the use of racial classifi-
cations.216 Further, the court found that the decision in Bakke,
2 17
which was rendered subsequent to the district court's ruling, did not
require reversal. Bakke was distinguished primarily on the grounds
that plaintiff there was absolutely excluded from attending the medical
school, whereas in Johnson, plaintiffs were provided the opportunity of
attending alternative schools.
218
The court also rejected plaintiffs' argument that they were made to
bear the entire burden of the remedy, thus demonstrating that defend-
209. 604 F.2d at 513-15.
210. Id. at 514.
211. Id at 515.
212. Id at 515, citing, University of Calif. Regents v. Bakke, 438 U.S. 265, 291 (Powell, J.,),
357 (Brennan, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part) (1978). See San Antonio Indep.
School Dist. v. Rodriguez, 411 U.S. 1 (1973); Loving v. Virginia, 388 U.S. 1 (1967).
213. In order for a classification to survive strict scrutiny, the defendant government body
must demonstrate its necessity for the achievement of a compelling state interest and that it is the
least restrictive way to accomplish the interest.
214. 604 F.2d at 516.
215. Id at 516-17.
216. Id at 517-18, citing, McDaniel v. Barresi, 402 U.S. 39 (1971); Swann v. Charlotte-Meck-
lenburg Bd. of Educ., 402 U.S. I (1971).
217. University of Calif. Regents v. Bakke, 438 U.S. 265 (1978).
218. 604 F.2d at 518.
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ants had not chosen the least discriminatory alternative. 219 Although
no white student had been denied admission to either Gage Park or
Morgan Park, the court noted that white students were precluded from
transferring to any other school until the quotas for white students had
been exceeded. Since the Plan was designed to address declining white
enrollment, the court found no inequity.
220
Armstrong v. Board of School Directors
In Armstrong v. Board of School Directors,221 a panel of the Sev-
enth Circuit222 considered the propriety of a settlement reached in the
fifteen year old Milwaukee school desegregation suit. In a case of first
impression, the Seventh Circuit rejected a challenge by intervening
plaintiffs who contended that the settlement was improperly accepted
by the district court because it stopped short of providing the relief
available in fully litigated school desegregation suits. 223 In so doing,
the panel established that the standard for the review of desegregation
plans initiated pursuant to settlement or consent decree was no differ-
ent from the standard that is applied to the settlement of other types of
federal class action litigation.224 The panel rejected plaintiffs' conten-
tion that in cases where intentional discrimination or other constitu-
tional violations had been found to exist, the interests of unnamed class
members could be protected only if the settlement incorporated reme-
dies which would be available for a fully litigated dispute. 225
The settlement at issue in Armstrong was arrived at in an attempt
to resolve a suit originally filed against Milwaukee schools in 1965.226
After nearly a decade and a half of litigation, the district court found
that the defendants had engaged in intentional discrimination with
"pervasive, systemwide impact" and ordered the parties to submit pro-
posed desegregation plans.2 27 A settlement agreement was subse-
quently negotiated by the parties and submitted to the court. 228 After a
219. Id at 518-19.
220. Id at 518.
221. 616 F.2d 305 (7th Cir. 1980).
222. The panel was composed of Judges Cudahy and Sprecher of the Seventh Circuit and
Senior District Judge Dumbauld of the Western District of Pennsylvania.
223. 616 F.2d at 316.
224. Id at 317-19.
225. Id at 316.
226. Id at 308.
227. Id at 309. Segregative intent must exist before a school board will be found to have
violated the fourteenth amendment. See Dayton Bd. of Educ. v. Brinkman, 433 U.S. 406 (1977);
Village of Arlington Heights v. Metropolitan Housing Dev. Corp., 429 U.S. 252 (1977); Washing-
ton v. Davis, 426 U.S. 229 (1976).
228. 616 F.2d at 309.
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series of fairness hearings designed to allow class members to raise ob-
jections to the settlement, the district court entered an order approving
the settlement plan.229 It was from this order that the intervening class
members appealed.
230
The intervening plaintiffs in Armstrong asserted that the principles
usually applied by federal courts to protect the interests of the public
and class members in class actions for money damages are inadequate
in cases where important constitutional violations have been found to
exist. 23' In order to adequately protect class members and the public
such settlements should meet the same standards as remedies which
result from full litigation.232 According to the plaintiffs, a lesser stan-
dard would allow considerations such as the offer of substantial attor-
neys' fees or crowded court dockets to influence the redress of the
violation of constitutional rights.
233
In rejecting the plaintiffs' arguments with regard to the need for a
higher standard in constitutional litigation, the panel reviewed the
traditional posture of federal courts favoring settlement of complex liti-
gation.234 In addition, it pointed to the procedures mandated by rule
23(e) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure and to the requirement,
imposed by courts of appeals, that district courts approve settlements
only where a settlement is found to be "fair, reasonable and ade-
quate. ' 235 The panel suggested that these procedures evidence the sen-
sitivity of federal courts to the need to protect class members' interests
in settlements or consent decrees. 236 However, it rejected plaintiffs'
contention that the "abuse of discretion" standard of review for the
229. Armstrong v. Board of School Directors, 471 F. Supp. 800 (E.D. Wis. 1979).
230. While the substance of the settlement is of interest it is not at the heart of the issue on
appeal. The settlement is reproduced in the district court opinion, 471 F. Supp. 800, 813-20 (E.D.
Wis. 1979), and will not be discussed here. Rather, this article will focus upon the Seventh Cir-
cuit's approach to the standard of review to be applied to the settlement.
Because intentional discrimination had been found to exist, the court could have imposed
interdistrict relief under Milliken v. Bradley, 418 U.S. 717 (1974) if the case had been fully liti-
gated and plaintiffs had shown that intentional racially discriminatory acts of officials had caused
interdistrict segregation. The settlement which was agreed to by the Milwaukee Schools and by
counsel for the named plaintiffs did not include interdistrict relief but the Milwaukee school sys-
tem did agree to a payment of attorneys' fees totalling over $800,000, pursuant to 42 U.S.C.
§ 1988, as part of the settlement agreement. The court approved both the plan and the fees.
231. 616 F.2d at 316 nn. 14 & 15.
232. Id
233. The settlement in this case included payment of $550,000 in fees and $13,428.11 to named
plaintiffs and $300,000 in fees and $27,350 in expenses for counsel for absent class members. The
litigation lasted almost 15 years. Id. at 312.
234. Id. at 312-13.
235. Id. at 313, citing, Dawson v. Patrick, 600 F.2d 70 (7th Cir. 1979); Grunin v. International
House of Pancakes, 513 F.2d 114 (8th Cir.), cert. denied, 423 U.S. 864 (1975).
236. 616 F.2d at 313-15.
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findings of the district court was inappropriate. 237 The panel viewed
plaintiffs' challenge to the settlement in this case as an attack upon the
propriety of resolving any desegregation litigation by settlement.
2 38
Noting judicial acceptance of settlement and consent decrees in other
settings, such as Title VII employment cases, the Seventh Circuit deter-
mined that settlement and consent decrees were appropriate means of
resolving school desegregation cases as well.
239
Recognizing that plaintiffs' concerns were not wholly without
foundation, 240 the court in Armstrong noted that factors such as the
duration of the litigation and the possibility of large attorneys' fees in
settlement offers might persuade counsel to settle for less than what
"might be procured through vigorous negotiation," could adversely af-
fect the interests of class members and the public.24' The court con-
cluded, however, that currently applicable principles for the review of
settlements in class actions were adequate but that two factors currently
in use should be emphasized in constitutional litigation.
242
First, the panel suggested that federal courts should apply settle-
ment principles with particular care and should give clear reasons for
their acceptance of settlements and consent decrees. Second, a settle-
ment which authorizes violation of clearly established constitutional or
legal principles must be rejected. The court, however, qualified this
second factor by making clear that the constitutional violation must
appear as a legal certainty on the face of the agreement. 243 This ap-
proach, according to the panel, would guarantee that litigants retain
flexibility in negotiating a settlement while avoiding the undercutting
of important national policies. 24
4
While it is axiomatic that settlement of litigation is a worthwhile
goal both in terms of minimizing the resources devoted to litigation and
implementing remedies to resolve the conflicts from which the litiga-
tion arose, it is not at all clear that the court in Armstrong struck the
proper balance between these considerations and the interests of plain-
tiffs in cases in which intentional constitutional violations have been
found to exist. In light of the panel's special attention to the use of
currently applicable standards to achieve a partial resolution of plain-
237. Id at 317-19.
238. Id at 316.
239. Id at 317 & n.17.
240. Id. at 319.
241. Id at 313.
242. Id at 319.
243. Id
244. Id at 319-20.
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tiffs' concerns, 245 it seems that the panel may also have been less than
completely comfortable with the standards which currently are applied
to class actions.
It must be pointed out that the dilemma which the panel sought to
address-the conflict between the desirability of settlement and the
protection of the constitutional rights of class members and the pub-
lic-was created at least in part by the panel's view of plaintiffs' chal-
lenge as a general attack upon the settlement of any litigation of
constitutional dimensions. 246 Plaintiffs' attack, however, can be fairly
characterized as being limited to cases, such as Armstrong, where dis-
crimination with segregative intent had already been found to exist.
Such a limited reading of plaintiffs' challenge might result in an analy-
sis which differed from that of the panel in two important respects.
First, the panel's reliance upon Title VII cases would be misplaced
since the ruling would apply only to cases in which violations of the
fourteenth amendment occurred. This may be important because proof
of intentional discrimination is required to sustain a cause of action for
violation of the equal protection clause, but is not required for a Title
VII violation. Thus, the requirement advanced by the plaintiffs-that
settlements in desegregation cases track those remedies resulting from
full litigation-would provide a disincentive for school authorities to
begin or continue intentional discrimination. If intentional discrimina-
tion could be found to exist, lengthy litigation and the offer of high
attorneys' fees would be less likely to be used to lessen the remedial
impact of the litigation. In addition, if the possibility exists that inten-
tional discrimination could be found, a school board would have a
much greater incentive to settle without lengthy litigation than it has
under the standards set forth in Armstrong.
Second, the interests of class members would be more fully pro-
tected. Although litigation involving unintentional segregation would
still be subject to the same settlement standards which are presently
applicable, remedies for intentionally perpetuated segregation could
not be bargained away by attorneys or the courts. Since defacto segre-
gation is more difficult both to identify and to resolve, the latitude in
settlement and the concern for deference to the district court's familiar-
ity with the litigants expressed in Armstrong, may be more properly
applied to non-intentional violation of constitutional rights.
245. See text accompanying notes 232-44 supra.
246. 616 F.2d at 316.
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United States v. Board of School Commissioners of Indianapolis
In United States v. Board of School Commissioners of Indianapo-
lis, 2 4 7 a panel consisting of Chief Judge Fairchild and Judges Swygert
and Tone was confronted with multiple challenges to a district court
ordered interdistrict desegregation plan. Both plaintiffs and defendants
challenged the plan as being either too broad or too narrow. 248 In up-
holding the interdistrict remedy which ordered the busing of black chil-
dren from Indianapolis schools to schools in surrounding districts, the
court discussed the method to be used in determining when interdistrict
relief is appropriate. Because such relief is dependant upon a finding
of intentional discrimination rather than merely discriminatory impact,
the panel also discussed the method to be used to determine whether
discrimination is, in fact, intentional.2 49 While there were other issues
in the case, discussion here will be limited to the methodology for prov-
ing intentional discrimination as outlined by the Seventh Circuit.
The panel began by pointing out that in Washington v. Davis,
250
the Supreme Court established that liability for racial discrimination
under the fourteenth amendment required proof of discriminatory pur-
pose on the part of the governmental agency in question. 25' However,
other than making clear that such purpose could be inferred from the
totality of the facts, including the fact of disparate impact, Washington
gave little direction as to how proof of intent could be shown.252 The
Arlington Heights253 decision suggested possible lines of inquiry which
might be used to prove the existence of purposeful discrimination in-
cluding: "historical background of the decision," "the specific se-
quence of events leading up to the decision," "departures from normal
procedural sequence," "substantive departures . . . particularly if the
factors usually considered. . . strongly favor a decision contrary to the
one reached" and "legislative or administrative history.
254
Applying these considerations to the Indianapolis case, the panel
reviewed the history of the recently enacted unified government plan in
Indianapolis (UNIGOV) as well as the legislative and judicial history
favoring segregation in Indiana.255 From facts which tended to show a
247. No. 79-1875 (7th Cir. Apr. 29, 1980).
248. Slip op. at 3.
249. Id. at 4-5.
250. 426 U.S. 229 (1976).
251. Slip op. at 4-5.
252. Id
253. Arlington Heights v. Metropolitan Housing Dev. Corp., 429 U.S. 252 (1977).
254. Id at 266-68.
255. Slip op. at 6-8.
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history of segregative intent in the state going back at least to 1867,256
and tailoring of the UNIGOV plan to specifically exclude consolida-
tion of the school districts covered by the new countywide government,
which perpetuated previous segregated conditions, 257 the Seventh Cir-
cuit concluded that a finding of discriminatory purpose was not clearly
erroneous. 258 In addition, the panel examined the relationship between
housing patterns and school racial population, which was recognized as
a proper factor to consider in creating remedies to segregation if the
housing patterns could be shown to be purposefully discriminatory. 259
In an earlier decision remanding this case for further findings of fact,
the Seventh Circuit adopted a four-part test for establishing the rela-
tionship between housing patterns and interdistrict desegregation reme-
dies.260 First, discriminatory practices must have caused segregative
housing patterns. Second, state action, either direct or indirect, must
have initiated, supported or contributed to these practices. Third, this
action, while not the sole cause, must have had a substantial effect in
bringing about the segregated conditi6ns. Fourth, even if the discrimi-
natory practices have ceased, a continuing segregative effect will be
enough to trigger interdistrict remedies.
26 1
The district court did not attempt to apply this standard to any acts
other than the location of public housing in Indianapolis. Therefore,
the Seventh Circuit limited its review to the actions of the Housing
Authority of the City of Indianapolis (HACI), since the Seventh Circuit
had already decided that discriminatory public housing policies were
sufficient to support interdistrict relief.
262
The panel upheld the district court's finding of a discriminatory
intent in housing site selections after noting that: (a) all housing
projects which were inhabited overwhelmingly by blacks were located
in the Indianapolis Public School District;263 (b) one project was built
across the street from a largely white school and annexed by the old
city on the housing authority's request over objections by the Indianap-
olis school system that existing school facilities were inadequate; 264 (c)
the School Commission refused the use of land in a white community
256. Id. at 7.
257. Id at 8-10.
258. Id at 11.
259. See, e.g., Milliken v. Bradley, 418 U.S. 717 (1974).
260. Slip op. at 11-12.
261. Id
262. Id at 12-13.
263. Id. at 15.
264. Id
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for a new school to replace the high school set aside for blacks; 265 (d)
HACI never attempted to secure cooperation agreements from sur-
rounding communities to allow the construction of public housing
outside of Indianapolis public school boundaries. 266 On these facts the
panel affirmed the district court's finding of segregative intent.
267
In a vigorous dissent, Judge Tone essentially agreed that the fac-
tors inArlington Heights should be used to determine whether discrimi-
nation is purposeful. 268 However, he disagreed completely with their
application in this case, contending that the history of school district
and city boundaries in Indiana did not indicate that they were in the
main co-terminus before UNIGOV.269 He rejected the panel major-
ity's reliance upon the history of discrimination in Indiana, stating in a
footnote that past discrimination in Indiana did not "lend much
weight" to the conclusion that current policies were also discriminatory
because "most if not all states" share a common discriminatory his-
tory. 270 Thus, Judge Tone apparently rejected the notion that the past
and present existence of society-wide invidious discrimination is a fac-
tor to be considered in determining whether discrimination is inten-
tional.
In addition, Judge Tone apparently rejected the majority's view of
the burden of proof in proving discriminatory intent. The majority was
content to review whether the district court's finding of intentional dis-
crimination with regard to the creation of UNIGOV and the exclusion
of the schools from its powers was supported by the facts. Judge Tone
maintained in dissent that facts tending to show discriminatory purpose
merely shift the burden of proof to the defendant. Once a non-discrim-
inatory basis for the action is established, the burden shifts back to the
plaintiff and may be rebutted by a showing that the state would have
taken the action in the absence of the invidious purpose. 27' Thus,
Judge Tone would impose upon the plaintiff the burden of showing
that an invidious purpose was not merely a substantial factor in the
government action but rather the determining factor. His conclusion is
that the facts in Indianapolis do not support the conclusion that the
UNIGOV-school district division occurred primarily for invidious pur-
poses. By this same reasoning, Judge Tone concludes that the major-
265. Id
'266. Id at 16.
267. Id
268. Id at 29 (Tone, J., dissenting).
269. Id at 37-40 (Tone, J., dissenting).
270. Id at 33 n.9 (Tone, J., dissenting).
271. Id at 35 (Tone, J., dissenting).
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ity's reliance on failure of the housing authority to seek approval of
sites outside the Indianapolis Public School District to find discrimina-
tory intent misplaced the burden of proving discriminatory intent.
272
Under the standard proposed by Judge Tone, discrimination
would be extremely difficult, if not impossible, to prove in any situation
where some valid governmental purpose could be asserted. If invidious
intent must be shown to be the determining factor in government ac-
tion and if the segregationist history of our society is to be viewed as
irrelevant in proving the existence of that intent, all but the most bla-
tantly discriminatory actions will escape sanction. The result would
likely be a diminution of the importance of section 1983 litigation, in-
creasing reliance upon statutory remedies such as Title VII and a se-
vere reduction in the likelihood of the imposition of interdistrict
remedies in desegregation litigation.
While it is true that all states share a history of institutionalized
racial segregation, the widespread nature of this invidious discrimina-
tion seems to be more a reason for carefully examining that history
than for ignoring it. The history of dejure segregation, rather, makes
the analysis of historical conditions necessary to understand the pres-
ent. The view of the majority in the Indianapolis case, which recog-
nizes that the present can only be understood in this manner, is an
absolute necessity if we are to avoid the perpetuation of systemic segre-
gation by allowing government to avoid responsibility for the past.
272. Id at 49-54 (Tone, J., dissenting).
